Despite ample evidence that our concepts, our cognitive architecture, and mathematics itself are all deeply compositional, few models take advantage of this structure. We therefore propose a radically compositional approach to computational neuroscience, drawing on the methods of applied category theory. We describe how these tools grant us a means to overcome complexity and improve interpretability, and supply a rigorous common language for scientific modelling, analogous to the type theories of computer science. As a case study, we sketch how to translate from compositional narrative concepts to neural circuits and back again.
Introduction
How should we conceive of concepts, of cognition, or of circuit computation? We argue: compositionally. Composition is the tool by which we construct complex concepts: constantly, informally, and automatically. But it is not just our concepts that are compositional: it has long been noted that our cognitive architecture is modular [1, 2] , and much of cognitive neuroscience relies on the well-tested assumption that this modularity maps onto the structure of the brain. Mathematics itself is increasingly recognized as compositional [3, 4] , and strong compositionality is increasingly used in software engineering to improve correctness and code reusability [5, 6] . Despite this simplifying power, few models in cognitive science and machine learning are actually compositional, even when modelling compositionality itself (eg., [7, 8] ).
We propose instead taking compositionality seriously, using the mathematics of compositioncategory theory-and show how doing so allows us to translate concepts between contexts and levels: from abstract concepts themselves [9, 10] to their possible realization in a circuit model. This paper is an abridged version of a work in progress, provisionally to appear in Compositionality, and we defer many formal details and proofs to that manuscript. In §2 we introduce the background mathematics. In §3, we introduce the conceptual setting. §4 shows how to translate concepts to circuits, and §5 suggests how to translate back again.
Category theory and the 'structure of structure'
A category is a very simple structure, capturing only what is necessary to enforce compositionality: Definition 1. A category C is a set of objects C 0 such that for any two objects x, y ∈ C 0 there is a set C(x, y) of arrows x → y obeying a composition rule: for any arrow f : x → y and any arrow g : y → z, there is a composite arrow g • f : x → z. Every object x ∈ C 0 has an identity arrow, id x ∈ C(x, x).
Being so general, almost all concepts can be formalized categorically. For example, there is a category whose objects are parts of speech and whose arrows are grammatical relations; and a category of vector spaces and linear maps. Category theory can also be applied to itself: there is a category Cat of categories, whose arrows are called functors: Definition 2. A functor is a structure-preserving arrow F : C → D between categories, mapping identities to identities and respecting composition:
Functors permit translating concepts from one category to another. A classic example is functorial semantics for language: one constructs a functor from a syntactic category (modelling grammar) to a semantic category (modelling meaning) that witnesses the compositionality of linguistic content.
There is frequently also a notion of parallel composition, which we denote ⊗. This situation is captured by the notion of monoidal category: Definition 3. A category C is monoidal if it is equipped with a functor ⊗ : C × C → C such that objects x and y and arrows f : x → a and g : y → b can be paired into compound objects x ⊗ y and 'parallel' arrows f ⊗ g : x ⊗ y → a ⊗ b. The functor ⊗ must satisfy some canonical coherence conditions, such as associativity, which are omitted for brevity. Many monoidal categories are symmetric, meaning that a ⊗ b ∼ = b ⊗ a.
Monoidal categories admit a calculus of string diagrams, in which arrows are represented by boxes on wires. Wires are annotated by their object type. Sequential composition is achieved by connecting wires of the same type, and parallel composition by parallel placement; in a symmetric monoidal category, wires can cross and be uncrossed. In the next section, we will meet some examples; for more details, see [11] . Meanwhile, we emphasize that any network or process diagram or computational graph is almost surely an arrow in some monoidal category.
Categorical probability theory. We review the monoidal categories of measurable spaces and of Bayesian networks. For details, we refer the reader to [12] . Proposition 4. There is a category Meas whose objects are measurable spaces (X, Σ X ) and whose arrows are measurable functions. Its monoidal product is the Cartesian product × of sets. Definition 5. The Giry monad G : Meas → Meas takes a measurable space (X, Σ X ) to the measurable space of (sub)probability distributions Σ X → [0, 1] over X. Definition 6. The category BayesNets is the Kleisli category of G. Its objects are again measurable spaces. Arrows X → Y in BayesNets are arrows X → G(Y ) in Meas. The identity map X → G(X) takes a point in X to the Dirac delta distribution over that point.
Since G(Y ) is equivalently the space of arrows {Σ Y → [0, 1]}, we can think of an arrow X → G(Y ) as equivalently an arrow X → {Σ Y → [0, 1]}. As in functional programming, we can 'uncurry' this to an arrow X × Σ Y → [0, 1]. This is a Markov kernel, the measure-theoretic form of a conditional probability distribution p(y|x), and the composite X → G(Z) of X → G(Y ) and Y → G(Z) is y p(z|y) p(y|x) dy = y p(z, y|x) dy = p(z|x). Henceforth, we will often write just y|x for an arrow X → G(Y ) in BayesNets. An arrow 1 → G(X) from the unit space 1 = { * } is a plain (unconditional) distribution over X.
We leave the monoidal structure ⊗ of BayesNets informal, as the intuition is familiar: it takes two distributions to their corresponding joint distribution. Consequently, we can think of any arrow in BayesNets as describing a Bayesian network.
Compositionality of narrative concepts
We choose as our model of concept representation Gärdenfors' classic 'conceptual spaces' [13] , and as our model of concept compositionality the 'DisCoCat' model of Coecke et al [10, 14] . In this account, complex concepts are composed from simple ones according to a grammar whose rules are witnessed by the arrows of a syntactic category, just as described in §2 for the functorial semantics of language. Crucially, concepts are modelled semantically as living in convex spaces [10] , as illustrated in Figure 1(a) . This point of view has recently received neurological validation [15] .
However, this basic account lacks two features: narrative (i.e., dynamics); and any concrete realization. To supply narrative, we can model sentences as inducing semantic transitions ('DisCoCirc', [16] ) in the underlying convex spaces -a view which accords with evidence from navigation in . NB: Just as the outer box can be wired up to other layers in the cortical hierarchy, the opaquely labeled inner boxes can be filled in with further structure (eg., for within-layer hidden states). The advantage of this framework is that this 'zooming in' can be performed in a completely rigorous manner.
hippocampal circuits [15, 17] . Next, we note that distributions in BayesNets form convex spaces, and that updating these states preserves this convex structure [18] . Thus we can model narrative as a 'conceptual' state-space model (Figure 1(b)-(d) ). Next, we map this onto a prototypical neural circuit.
4 From compositional concepts to compositional circuits ...
Above, we moved rigorously from an abstract compositional concept model to a probabilistic statespace representation. Here, we see how this could be mapped onto neural circuits, emphasizing the compositionality of such 'Bayesian brain' circuits. Recall that under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, the cortical hierarchy can be interpreted as a message-passing architecture solving an approximate inference problem [19] . For simplicity, we restrict ourselves here to discrete-time models, and thus make the following definition: Definition 7. A discrete dynamical system (DDS) is a pair of functions f upd : I × S → S and f out : S → O, which we call update and output. S is the state space, I the input space and O the output space. There is a category DDS whose objects are DDSs and whose arrows are wirings of outputs to inputs [20, 21] .
Predictive coding models under the free energy principle have a somewhat formidable reputation. The following theorem, whose proof we only sketch, establishes that this is unjustified: compositionality ensures that complexity can be reduced to its elements. Theorem 8. There is a functor F : BayesNets → NeurCirc − → DDS, where NeurCirc is a subcategory of DDS consisting of neural circuits of the form illustrated below. F maps measurable spaces to layers of neurons, and conditional probability distributions to message-passing architectures.
Let µ i represent neural activity at cortical hierarchy level i. The key idea is that the brain embodies both a generative model µ i |µ i+1 (Figure 2(a) )-e.g., modelling expected transitions in latent states µ i+1 of the environment and how these states cause perceptual signals µ i -and a recognition model µ i+1 |µ i : an approximate Bayesian inversion of the generative model, taking perceptual signals back to inferred latent causes. This is illustrated in Figure 2(b) . At each stage, neural dynamics minimize the KL divergence between the recognition and generative densities [22] . Under some simplifying assumptions, there is an upper bound on this divergence called the free energy [22] , written:
The over-arrows are purely syntactic sugar to indicate whether a quantity is transmitted from sense organs to higher cortex (←) or vice versa (→). We call the µ i state units and define error units as
We construct the dynamics of the circuits encoding µ i to minimize F , and so we write:
where ∆ i is the transition function of the generative dynamics, g is the inter-layer transfer function, and κ is a learning rate. Note that state units thus receive error signals from the current layer and that immediately below, whereas error units receive state signals from the current layer and that immediately above, as illustrated in Figure 2 (c). Writing ξ i ∈ E i and µ i ∈ M i , and letting
, we can package our definitions of µ i (t) and ξ i (t) into the forms f upd i :
To demonstrate the functoriality of F, we particularly need to show that it preserves composition. This is immediate from the associativity of the sum in (1) and compositionality of output-input wiring in DDS.
... and back again
Under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, much of neuroscience can be interpreted as inferring the form of the generative model implied by the structure of neural circuits; that is, as inverting the functor F. When we have a situation involving two functors F : C → D and G : D → C such that the composites F • G and G • F lead you back somehow to your starting point, then we say that F and G are adjoint.
This 'modelling' adjunction is a largely syntactic one: the structure of a probabilistic model is mapped to the structure of a neural circuit. Even so, it is a deep one, similar to that between proofs and programs [11] . Cognitive scientists are however typically interested in the semantics of these circuits, i.e., their behavior. And indeed there is a related adjunction between formal machines and their behaviors [23] that is already used in computer science for verification [24] and testing [25] . Yet another related adjunction is that which gave rise to our view of distributions as convex spaces [18] .
To illustrate this (see figure on accompanying poster): first, we need a closed dynamical system, which means supplying any unwired inputs with some data, 1 → I, and discarding any unused output O → 1. This gives a closed system S → G(S). Given an initial state s 0 : 1 → S, we can generate behavior distributions by iterating the system. Necessarily, these live in a convex space which includes the concept spaces we began with.
Conclusions, in context
Categorical methods supply us with a compositional type theory for science: different concepts and models are collected into categories, which tell us how to compose when the types match. Categories themselves are collected into a 'meta'-category, which provides a context for translating ideas between settings, thereby elucidating common structures; for instance, the 'symbolic-vs-connectionist' debate [26, 27] is dissolved by functorial semantics. This kind of rigorous conceptual modularity will be increasingly important as we strive to build ever more complex yet interpretable models, and understand ever more complex systems.
Space constraints mean much has been omitted: in particular, there is much more to say on the compositional structure of interacting neural circuits and their supervenient representations. There is also much to say about contextuality, which can be seen as a kind of failure of compositionality. Even so, category theory supplies the tools to deal with it rigorously, via fibrations and sheaves; such a treatment once more sheds light on the neural substrate. Finally, the treatment here has been theoretical: but simulations are in progress.
